On Preferences

Suppose we start this posting with four suppositions.

Secondly, suppose we are either totally indifferent about, or have equal preference to, two distinct things.

Thirdly, suppose these things are anything, from tangible to abstract objects.

And, lastly, suppose someone presents to us two arguments, spoken or written, not necessarily in opposition to one another. Both arguments are equally reasonable, well more or less so.

Then, which one will get the better of us? If we must choose, how to do it? How to let go of the other option equally preferrable?

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This afternoon I took my daughter to a kid’s shop in Bintaro Plaza. We had agreed not to buy anything today; she had agreed to wait until my next payday. After a few minutes, I asked her which one particular toy she’d prefer if I’d had the money. In the end she faced a dilemma over two Bionicle toys. She could not decide on her choice. If only today had been my payday, she would’ve returned home with one particular Bionicle. By then, I’d have known her choice, but only from the end of her thinking process; her demonstrated, or revealed, preference.
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Perhaps such is the thing with tastes, one would say. Tastes have a lot to do with what we feel--or think--about them. There is no accounting to tastes, you’d probably add. Thus, tastes, or preferences, have to do with opinions, which do not necessarily belong to the agent in question.
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Don't our schedules of preferences depend on some kind of pre-existing, if vague, opinions about things? Inversely, don't our opinions about things rest on our pre-existing preferences, say, on sheer attraction or something emotionally evoking. As long as we cannot decide which "toy" to take, we will have at least two competitive yet unresolved opinions.

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