Artikel di Business News (ed. 7497) yang berjudul Krisis Ilmu Ekonomi dan Munculnya Paradigma Baru Ekonomi memuat agak terlalu banyak kesalahan fundamental untuk dikoreksi.
Di paragraf pertama, artikel ini mengidentikkan teori neo-klasik dengan liberalisme atau bahkan ultra-liberalisme. Dikatakan bahwa konsep ekonom neo-klasik adalah bahwa masyarakat harus membiarkan kebebasan sebesar-besarnya bagi manusia untuk melakukan kegiatan ekonomi atau dalam istilah umum disebut laissez-faire.
Bagaimana mungkin ekonom neo-klasik disebut sebagai pendukung atau advocate dari laissez faire yang pada hakekatnya tidak menemukan legitimasi bagi institusi non-pasar untuk ikut campur tangan di pasar, apalagi untuk mengendalikan perekonomian?
Untuk memahami perbedaan yang subtil ini orang perlu melongok lebih jauh ke lembaran sejarah abad ke-19 di Eropa, untuk mengetahui bagaimana terjadinya pembajakan istilah liberalisme di abad tersebut, sehingga konsep tersebut di jaman itu kini diasosiasikan penuh dengan konotasi negatif seperti yang dipahami oleh sebagian besar dari kita dewasa ini. Posting saya sebelumnya (Cek Kosong Demokrasi; khususnya di sub-bagian Milton Friedman) menyinggung hal ini.
Sebagai simpulan bagi yang mau instan, anggap saja ada Liberalisme 1 dan Liberalisme 2. Yang satu sangat positif; senafas dengan semangat perekonomian pasar yang laissez faire; yang kedua sangat negatif, yang sarat dengan intervensionisme dan statisme.
Liberalisme 1 kini harus disebut sebagai Liberalisme klasik. Sementara Liberalisme 2 adalah sebagaimana umumnya dipahami sekarang; Liberalisme. Di sini terlihat, para eksponen laissez faire dan perekonomian pasar bahkan harus kehilangan definisi kuncinya, karena sudah terbajak lewat propaganda.
Selain itu, paragraf terakhir dalam artikel di atas menyimpulkan bahwa ekonomi itu tidak bebas nilai.
Perlu ditandaskan bahwa ekonomi adalah disiplin yang wertfrei, bebas-nilai. Bukan berarti disiplin ini akan membawa ke nihilisme, melainkan bahwa ilmu ekonomi adalah disiplin positif (bukan normatif) yang mencoba menemukan hubungan sebab akibat yang sebenar-benarnya di dunia.
Seperti juga ilmu kedokteran yang bersifat bebas-nilai, orang perlu mempelajari virus AIDS atau kloning secara netral untuk memahaminya. Tetapi aplikasi ilmu ekonomi atau ilmu kedokteranlah yang memang sering melibatkan semacam penghakiman nilai.
On Preferences
Suppose we start this posting with four suppositions.
Secondly, suppose we are either totally indifferent about, or have equal preference to, two distinct things.
Thirdly, suppose these things are anything, from tangible to abstract objects.
And, lastly, suppose someone presents to us two arguments, spoken or written, not necessarily in opposition to one another. Both arguments are equally reasonable, well more or less so.
Then, which one will get the better of us? If we must choose, how to do it? How to let go of the other option equally preferrable?
*
This afternoon I took my daughter to a kid’s shop in Bintaro Plaza. We had agreed not to buy anything today; she had agreed to wait until my next payday. After a few minutes, I asked her which one particular toy she’d prefer if I’d had the money. In the end she faced a dilemma over two Bionicle toys. She could not decide on her choice. If only today had been my payday, she would’ve returned home with one particular Bionicle. By then, I’d have known her choice, but only from the end of her thinking process; her demonstrated, or revealed, preference.
*
Perhaps such is the thing with tastes, one would say. Tastes have a lot to do with what we feel--or think--about them. There is no accounting to tastes, you’d probably add. Thus, tastes, or preferences, have to do with opinions, which do not necessarily belong to the agent in question.
*
Don't our schedules of preferences depend on some kind of pre-existing, if vague, opinions about things? Inversely, don't our opinions about things rest on our pre-existing preferences, say, on sheer attraction or something emotionally evoking. As long as we cannot decide which "toy" to take, we will have at least two competitive yet unresolved opinions.
Secondly, suppose we are either totally indifferent about, or have equal preference to, two distinct things.
Thirdly, suppose these things are anything, from tangible to abstract objects.
And, lastly, suppose someone presents to us two arguments, spoken or written, not necessarily in opposition to one another. Both arguments are equally reasonable, well more or less so.
Then, which one will get the better of us? If we must choose, how to do it? How to let go of the other option equally preferrable?
*
This afternoon I took my daughter to a kid’s shop in Bintaro Plaza. We had agreed not to buy anything today; she had agreed to wait until my next payday. After a few minutes, I asked her which one particular toy she’d prefer if I’d had the money. In the end she faced a dilemma over two Bionicle toys. She could not decide on her choice. If only today had been my payday, she would’ve returned home with one particular Bionicle. By then, I’d have known her choice, but only from the end of her thinking process; her demonstrated, or revealed, preference.
*
Perhaps such is the thing with tastes, one would say. Tastes have a lot to do with what we feel--or think--about them. There is no accounting to tastes, you’d probably add. Thus, tastes, or preferences, have to do with opinions, which do not necessarily belong to the agent in question.
*
Don't our schedules of preferences depend on some kind of pre-existing, if vague, opinions about things? Inversely, don't our opinions about things rest on our pre-existing preferences, say, on sheer attraction or something emotionally evoking. As long as we cannot decide which "toy" to take, we will have at least two competitive yet unresolved opinions.
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