Time through the ink of history—and the hands of historians--will testify whether RI’s ex-president Soeharto will escape through his demise as a villain, or be immortalized as a hero, or a bit of both.
This can wait; meanwhile, the timely question seems to gravitate over the post-Soeharto situation at home. Yes, post-Soeharto Indonesia, what is it like?
It's rather easy to answer. The fact is, we have lived it for almost 10 years now! It started one late afternoon on May 21, when he resigned as a president, saying his own words that “I have decided to quit”, back in 1998. Following the statement, he had practically ostracized himself from the political ground. Yet, his resignation did not, by any means, mean a weakening of his strong grips, not even when he is no longer around us, let alone over what went immediately after that fateful day, on to what is happening today and what will unfurl beyond.
The extensive and intensive media coverage around his illness and demise was clearly not his own design. Clearly it suggests that Soeharto still remained very dear to many—most conspicuously among the powers that be, within the media bigwicks, and the most gullible public. Whatever successes our former president has done over his three decades of power, and whatever failures for that matter, cannot have been appropriately attributed solely to his own finesse and flaws.
Speaking strictly, it would be impossible to dissect post-Soeharto situation in the country and classify it under separate rubrics such as political, economic, legal compartments, et cetera. It would in fact involve a grave fallacy, simply because they are closely interlinked. For the sake of convenience, this posting only offers random notes based on his legacies and some unfinished business
Dubious Ascent to Power
Was Soeharto, through the 11 March 1966 instruction, really mandated by President Soekarno to take control of the chaotic situation? The fact speaks for itself. The whereabout of the original document has remained shrouded in mystery. Part of our energy will have to be geared towards solving this seeming perennial problem. One would be tempted to question as to what had kept him from spilling the beans. Had he been truly mandated by Soekarno, and had he had genuine concern over the young nation, he would have given the issue his best thoughts, since it is far more than just about his personal dignity.
Criminal Records
Pending investigation on alleged abuses criminal charges against Soeharto; five major cases here include the arrest of some 10,000 political activists in Buru island between 1969-1979; mysterious shootings of about 5,000 people (aka. Petrus cases in Java, Sumatra and Kalimantan) in 1981-1985, July 27 of 1997 incident involving supporters of PDI-P; the Tanjung Priok case (killing 24 people and injuring hundreds of others in 1984 and the case of Military Operation Areas (DOM) in Aceh and Papua from 1970s-1990s) cases of kidnapping and abuses.
Militaristic Overzeal
The loud message coming out from his stretched two and thirty years in power is that of strong militaristic domination. His personal ‘success’ has been Indonesia’s systemic failure as a nation. Most generals or mayor generals today seem to nurture a false calling that they should run this country. Participation of many military officers in practical politics today is indicative—some are even running governmental offices while still retaining their military positions. This phenomenon will remain a serious challenge to civil citizens.
Possibly inseparable from his military background, Soeharto’s leadership has been one notoriously reliant on authoritarianism, personal charisma, likes and dislikes, violence and fear-instillation. His own downfall is a lesson that there is no such thing as real true friend in politics; only perennial interest exists. Some politicians may learn the lesson the wrong way; they will be tempted to loot the country as long as they wear the red and white badge of power.
Corruption and Legal Impotence
Moreover, countless cases of mega corruption have been charged and alleged against Soeharto, his family members and aides. After ten years the state of the matter has not altered much, and as long as we remain sane, we still have very little reason indeed to believe that they will be . A particular setback in the case of Soeharto against the Time Magazine, where the latter has been made the culprit, is tell-tale enough as to how issues have evolved in this area.
Progress and setback in legal enforcement will reflect itself in the manner the current authorities treat the legal cases implicating him. Supremacy of the law itself is being put under its acid test.
Performance of Post-Soeharto Governments
The fact that four presidents succeeding Soeharto, namely BJ. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Soekarnoputri, and SBY have displayed mediocrity, if not worse performance than that of Soeharto, could generate its own detriments. The lack of freedom of the distant past could be mistaken as stability; and stability and government favoritism could be misguidedly recalled as a sign of prosperity. Despite the fact that Indonesia’s rice independence only occurred for 2-3 years only throughout the stretched Soeharto regime, some people refuse to believe in the myth; they want to believe that life under Soeharto’s New Order was better.
Passion for Debt
A great passion for debts that started since the early days of the Republic has grown into a critical issue. Indonesia has resorted practically to all kinds of ways imaginable to borrow and inflate its own money. Persistent fiscal deficits and the mounting figures of governmental debts speak for themselves. Deferring repayments and creating new debts are a deadly combination that will strangulate its citizens to death.
Decentralization
Advocates of decentralization must have amazingly believed in the costly assumption that governments are a benevolent factor to the citizens. The naïve assumption has been challenged by the many reports that suggested it to be otherwise, such as those on rampant regional corruptions; local investment barriers; the fact that more than 70% of regional budgets are being spent for governmental expenditures; and the likes. The big bang decentralization will remain a pain in the neck for a long time, particularly regarding fiscal burdens, demarcation of authority problem, setting of minimum service standards, etc.
